Financial market developments and their implications for monetary policy by Már Gudmundsson & Bank for International Settlements
BIS Papers No 39  7
 
 
Financial globalisation: key trends and implications for  




It is widely acknowledged that the transmission mechanism of monetary policy will evolve as 
domestic financial markets develop and mature. This development will in turn affect the 
relative effectiveness of different monetary instruments. Thus the interest rate channel of 
monetary policy
2 will tend to be weak when domestic bond markets are underdeveloped and 
banks dominate intermediation of short-term domestic credit and foreign currency 
denominated funds. In this setting, monetary policy will mainly affect the economy through 
exchange rate management and/or changes in the domestic money supply. Direct measures, 
such as politically decided discreet changes in the exchange rate (mostly old style 
devaluations), and quantitative instruments (eg reserve requirements) will be the dominant 
tools of monetary policy. 
However, the importance of the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission will 
grow as domestic financial markets develop and both firms and households finance their 
expenditure and investment to a greater degree in terms of domestic currency and at ever 
longer maturities, either in bond markets or through bank credit. This will in turn enhance the 
role of market-based indirect instruments, primarily interest rates on short-term lending by 
central banks to commercial banks, and create the conditions for market-determined 
exchange rates. 
There is some debate regarding to what degree, and under what conditions, the external 
liberalisation of domestic financial systems will further promote the development of the 
financial system. However, in spite of some financial stability risks, it seems that countries 
generally benefit through economies of scale, increased competition and deeper and more 
liquid financial markets, at least if certain minimum conditions are met.
3 The cross-border 
financial integration triggered by external financial liberalisation will thus in most cases give a 
further boost to domestic financial market development and, in doing so, to the interest rate 
channel of monetary policy transmission. However, we also know from economic theory that 
co-movements of asset returns will increase as cross-border financial integration progresses, 
which, for small countries that are unable to affect global asset returns, will mean that 
domestic interest rates at longer maturities will increasingly be affected by global rates. In 
other words, although cross-border financial integration might initially give a boost to the 
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2   In this paper the interest rate channel refers to the effects of monetary policy action on inflation that occur 
through changes in those interest rates that are relevant for demand and employment. 
3   See, for instance, Kose et al (2006). 8  BIS Papers No 39 
 
 
interest rate channel due to favourable effects on the development of domestic capital 
markets, it will eventually be its demise. 
This paper is concerned with the progress of financial globalisation and the effect it might be 
having on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
4 It focuses mainly on two sets of 
countries: small and medium-sized developed countries that have adopted a floating 
exchange rate and inflation targeting (IT) and selected emerging market countries. 
The reasons for focusing in the first instance on the mature IT countries are three-fold. First, 
countries with developed and open financial systems should in general be more closely 
integrated with the global financial system than emerging market countries. This should 
therefore bring the effects of financial globalisation as such into sharper focus. In emerging 
market countries the signs of such effects might be blurred by problems related to structural 
and institutional vulnerabilities, partly reflected in high and variable country risk premia. 
Second, both theory and experience demonstrate the trilemma that those countries operating 
pegged exchange rates and open capital accounts lose control over domestic financial 
conditions. They neither have nor seek the opportunity to operate independent monetary 
policy. The issue being investigated in this paper is therefore not strictly speaking relevant for 
these countries. Third, focusing on the above set of countries makes it possible to use long 
data series. 
However, we are also interested in the degree to which financial globalisation is affecting the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy in emerging market countries. Therefore an 
attempt will be made to replicate some of the analysis for those emerging market countries 
that come closest to the mature IT countries, either by having adopted an IT regime or by 
having relatively developed and open financial sectors. 
The main questions that will be addressed in the paper are the following: 
•  How might financial globalisation be expected to affect the transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy in countries that are developed and financially sophisticated, but 
not large enough to significantly affect global financial conditions? 
•  What does the data indicate on the development of the interest rate channel of 
monetary policy in the chosen sample of countries? 
•  What is the evidence on the exchange rate channel? To what degree have 
exchange rate movements been part of a desired monetary policy transmission and 
economic adjustment, and to what degree have they been decoupled from 
fundamentals and thus become a source of instability? 
•  In as much as ongoing financial globalisation creates problems for macroeconomic 
management in small and medium-sized financially open countries, is there a set of 
changes to institutions, frameworks and policies that would, at least partly, address 
such problems? 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: the next section defines financial globalisation 
and discusses how its progress could be measured. Section II then surveys key trends and 
looks at different aspects of the progress of financial globalisation.
5 Section III provides a 
                                                  
4   There is a growing discussion among central bankers and academics on the implications of globalisation for 
monetary policy (see for instance Bernanke (2007), BIS (2006), Bollard (2007), Rogoff (2006) and Weber 
(2007)). This debate has two strands: the effect that real globalisation is having on the inflation process and 
the effect that financial globalisation is having on the transmission mechanism. This paper is concerned with 
the second aspect. 
5   Financial globalisation is a multifaceted phenomenon. This paper focuses on those aspects that are most 
relevant for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. However, there are also important financial 
stability issues involved, especially in connection with the globalisation of financial institutions. The latest BIS 
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discussion of the implications of financial globalisation for the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy. Section IV provides some evidence on the evolution of the interest rate 
channel among small and medium-sized IT countries and a selected group of emerging 
market economies. Section V discusses the exchange rate channel. Section VI examines 
some policy issues and Section VII concludes. 
I.  What is financial globalisation? 
A fully integrated market is one where economic agents face a single set of rules, have equal 
access and are treated equally. By implication, the law of one price would hold in such a fully 
integrated market, ie risk-adjusted real returns on assets with the same maturity and other 
characteristics would be equal. Note, however, that frictions could still be present, but they 
should be symmetric, ie the same for all agents, sectors and locations (in the case of spatial 
integration).
6 Using this definition we could define financial integration as the process by 
which financial markets and institutions become more tightly interlinked and move closer to 
full integration, under which the law of one price would hold. Finally, given the above 
definitions, financial globalisation is cross-border financial integration that is reasonably 
spread around the globe.
7 
It is important to bear in mind that the above definition implies that financial globalisation, or 
cross-border financial integration, is a process rather than a state of nature. Furthermore, this 
process is only partly driven by governmental action. Governments can in principle lift legal 
restrictions on capital movements overnight (although it would in most cases not be 
advisable to do so). They could possibly also move relatively quickly to harmonise diverse 
rules, regulations and practices that are impediments to cross-border financial integration, 
although in practice this is often a drawn out process and differences in legal systems and 
business practices tend to be significant impediments to free flow of capital. Furthermore, 
legal freedom to practise financial innovation could be expected over time to reduce frictions 
to the flow of capital. The abolition of government-imposed restrictions to the flow of capital 
will thus not instantaneously result in the law of one price holding across countries. It will at 
least require several years of a market-driven integration process. And even then, the 
theoretical limiting case might never be reached. 
The potential implications of cross-border financial integration provide us with candidate 
measures of its ongoing process. Some of these implications are: 
•  Covered interest parity should hold. 
•  Stronger co-movement of asset returns across countries. 
                                                                                                                                                      
Annual Report includes a special section on the internationalisation of banking where key trends are surveyed 
and relevant policy issues discussed (see BIS (2007)). IMF (2007a and b) also provides an interesting 
analytical examination of the financial stability aspect of the internationalisation of financial institutions and 
asset management. BIS (2006) also covers several aspects of financial globalisation. Finally, the author of this 
paper discussed both the financial stability and monetary policy aspects of financial globalisation in a recent 
speech (see Gudmundsson (2007)). 
6   This definition is a slightly adapted version of the one provided by Baele et al (2004) in their study on financial 
integration in the euro area. 
7   Cross-border financial globalisation involving only a few countries (eg the US and Canada) with the bulk of the 
world being financially insular would thus not meet the criteria of financial globalisation. Using the same 
terminology we define regional financial integration as cross-border financial integration that is contained 
within a specific region. 10  BIS Papers No 39 
 
 
•  Greater scope for risk sharing across countries through output and/or consumption 
smoothing. 
•  Greater potential to decouple domestic saving and investment. 
These implications provide several potential measures of ongoing cross-border financial 
integration. Below is a taxonomy of tendencies that would be consistent with a higher degree 
of cross-border financial integration: 
1.  Legal or regulatory measures: 
•  Lower level of legal restrictions on capital flows. 
•  Lower level of other legal and regulatory-based impediments to cross-border 
financial integration, including taxation and the design of monetary instruments. 
2. Price-based  measures: 
•  Covered interest rate parity holds. 
•  Increased co-movement of asset returns. 
3. Quantity-based  measures: 
•  Higher level of gross cross-border capital flows. 
•  Higher level of cross-border assets and liabilities. 
•  Reduced home bias in domestic portfolios. 
•  Lower correlations of domestic saving and investment. 
•  Lower correlations of domestic consumption and GDP. 
Taken individually, there are significant caveats associated with several of the measures 
above. 
Taking price-based measures first: measuring real risk-adjusted returns is complicated in the 
absence of good measures of inflation expectations and direct measures of risk premia. In 
practice we tend to look at correlations of changes in nominal interest rates of similar 
maturity and risk or correlations of equity returns. There will thus be a measurement bias, 
which should, however, stack the cards against detecting the effects of financial integration, 
due to the statistical result that it biases estimated coefficients towards zero. Additionally, 
observed co-movements might not have anything to do with ongoing financial integration and 
might instead be reflecting the existence of common shocks. 
The measurement problems might be somewhat smaller in the case of the quantity-based 
measures. Several of these also have the additional benefit of being available and relatively 
comparable across a range of countries and time periods. However, there is no clear 
benchmark in the case of gross capital flows or cross-border assets and liabilities and it is 
possible to construct examples where these would increase without progress in financial 
integration, as defined above, and also examples to the contrary, where they would be 
constant in the face of such financial integration. However, cross-border assets and liabilities 
would in general be expected to increase, at least so long as financial integration reduces 
home bias. 
II.  The progress of financial globalisation 
Due to the above-mentioned caveats one should preferably look at a broad range of 
measures when assessing the progress of financial globalisation. The picture that emerges 
from such a broad perspective is one that is consistent with significant progress in financial BIS Papers No 39  11
 
 
globalisation during the last decade and a half. This is not particularly surprising given that 
several mature economies still had capital controls in place in the middle of the 1980s that 
were lifted in the following few years and that a string of emerging market countries removed 
restrictions to capital movements in the 1990s. Correlations of changes in long-term interest 
rates have increased significantly during this period, although this could, at least partly, be 
due to other reasons than financial globalisation. Additionally, both gross capital flows and 
gross external positions (measured by the sum of foreign assets and liabilities as a 
percentage of GDP) have increased strongly during this period. Let us now survey the key 
trends in more detail. 
De jure measures 
There are several studies that demonstrate the lifting of formal barriers to cross-border trade 
in financial assets in recent decades. Thus Stulz (2005) quotes an index of formal restrictions 
on capital movements based on IMF data that takes the value of 12 when a country is 
completely financially open and 0 when it is completely closed. This index was 3.5 for the UK 
in 1950 but reached 12 in 1979. For a constant sample of mature countries it was 4.2 in 1950 
but 11.6 in 1999. For a constant sample of 68 emerging and developing countries the index 
was 5.6 in 1973, but reached 8.3 in 1997. In 2005, the emerging and developing economies 
were on average at the same level as mature economies were in 1970. This average, 
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1 Average of 1/0 dummy variable indicating the existence of controls on capital account transactions; data for 1983–1995 are from Miniane 
(2004); data for 1995–2005 are from various editions of the IMF’s Annual report on exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions. 
2 China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan (China) and Thailand; prior to 1995, 
excludes China, Indonesia, Taiwan (China) and Thailand.    3 New EU members, ie Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.    4 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela; prior to 1995, 
excludes Peru and Venezuela. 
Source: García-Herrero and Wooldridge (2007).
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Graph  1, which is adopted from Garcia-Herrero and Wooldridge (2007), shows the 
development of legal restrictions on capital movements among the G7 and regional averages 
of emerging market countries. The index varies from 1 (full control) to 0 (no restrictions) and 
is an average of several categories of restrictions that each take the value 1 or 0 according to 
the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. It 
shows a significant fall in such restrictions in Latin America and emerging Europe, but less of 
a change in Asia, which also has a higher level of restrictions than the other two regions. 
This reflects the fact that there are still significant capital controls in place in several 
emerging Asian countries, not least in China and India. 12  BIS Papers No 39 
 
 
Covered interest rate parity 
Covered interest rate parity states that the interest rate differential of any specific maturity 
between two countries is equal to the percentage difference between the forward exchange 
rate of that same maturity and the spot exchange rate. This is a pure arbitrage non-risk 
relationship and should hold more or less exactly if capital is free to move between bank 
deposits and fixed income markets in the relevant countries.
8 It is therefore an elementary 
test of cross-border financial integration and the relationship holds between financially open 
mature economies. García-Herrero and Wooldridge (2007) look at 3-month money market 
rates for a selected group of emerging market countries. They find that covered interest rate 
parity tends to hold where legal restrictions on capital movements have been lifted, whereas 
there are sometimes sizeable deviations where capital controls are still in place.
9 
Co-movements 
There are, as mentioned in the last section, several caveats associated with using co-
movements of asset returns as indicators of the progress of financial integration. First, we 
have measurement problems. Second, observed co-movements could be due to other 
factors, such as common shocks. Third, correlations of stock returns, in particular, tend to 
increase in bear markets and during periods of heightened volatility in world financial 
markets. Fourth, correlations of stock returns usually do not correct for differences in industry 
structure. Bekaert et al (2005) demonstrate the difficulties that these caveats can create for 
the interpretation of co-movements of equity returns. Only in the case of Europe do they find 
evidence of a significant positive trend in correlations of stock returns. They conclude that 
there is no definitive evidence that cross-country correlations of these stock returns are 
significantly and permanently higher than they were 10 years ago. 
Graph 2 
 
                                                  
8   Transaction costs might create some divergence. 
9   Note in this context that the covered interest rate parity test is only partial as far as overall capital account 
liberalisation is concerned. It would for instance hold at short maturities for a country that heavily restricted 
equity flows and foreign direct investments, so long as a forward exchange rate market existed and money 
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In spite of these caveats it is a worthwhile exercise to look at the evolution of co-movements 
of asset returns. Apart from the measurement problems in the case of bond yields, most of 
the caveats are asymmetric in the sense that observed increases in co-movements might not 
be due to increased cross-border financial integration, whereas the converse is not true, ie 
there cannot be significant progress in financial globalisation without it tending to increase 
co-movements. It is therefore a useful check to see if the trend in co-movements is at least 
consistent with the financial globalisation story. 
First we look at the development of correlations of returns on some major global asset 
classes. Graph 2 (left hand panel) shows that the correlations of stock returns in Europe and 
among emerging markets with those of the US increased to a relatively high level in the latter 
half of the 1990s and have broadly remained at that level, although there has been some 
weakening of the correlation vis-à-vis emerging markets since the middle of 2006. A broadly 
similar pattern emerges in the case of German and US long-term government bonds. 
Graph 2 (right hand panel) shows the emerging market sovereign spread and the US high-
yielding corporate spread vis-à-vis US treasuries since 1997. The correlation has been rather 
close this decade, whether that is due to financial globalisation or other factors. 
Next we look at correlations of monthly changes in long-term government bond yields with 
those of US government bonds of the same maturity. Graph 3 shows these for a sample of 
seven mature inflation targeting economies over the period 1990–2005 and for selected 
emerging market economies for a shorter period. The correlations have risen significantly 
among the mature inflation targeting countries, except in those cases where they were 
already high at the beginning of the period. Correlations have also risen somewhat among 
the selected emerging market economies, although, as expected, they are lower than among 
the more globally financially integrated mature inflation targeting countries, except in the 
case of Hong Kong SAR, which has a currency board vis-à-vis the US dollar. 
Graph 3 
 
Gross external positions 
Gross external positions, ie foreign assets and liabilities as a percentage of GDP, have, 
following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) and recommendations by Kose et al (2006), 
become popular in the literature as measures of the cross-border financial integration of 
individual countries and regions. However, as discussed in the last section, this measure has 
its caveats. Graph 4 shows gross external positions since the beginning of the 1990s for 
different regions of the world. It shows a marked increase in all regions and reveals that 
emerging Asia is more integrated, on the basis of this measure, than either emerging Europe 




The high level of home bias in domestic asset portfolios in spite of open capital accounts has 
remained somewhat of a puzzle. Stulz (2005) and Kho et al (2006) attribute home bias to 
agency problems in corporate governance, and in particular to the role of corporate insiders, 
but also to governmental action that can reduce the payoff to corporate outsiders. Kho et al 
find support for this theory using firm-level data for Korea. If this is case, then home bias 
might remain high in equity portfolios, even if, at the same time, financial globalisation 
produces a convergence of returns in fixed income markets, which are to a certain degree 
more important for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. In addition to country 
home bias, the data indicates that there is a regional bias in foreign portfolio allocations (see 
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1 Foreign assets plus foreign liabilities, as a percentage of GDP.    2 Including intra-euro area assets and liabilities.    3 Excluding intra-euro 
area assets and liabilities.    4 China, Hong Kong SAR, India,Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan (China) and 
Thailand.    5 New EU members, ie Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
6 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. 
Sources: P R Lane and G M Milesi-Ferretti, "The external wealth of nations mark II: revised and extended estimates of foreign assets




The correlation of saving and investment in individual countries is potentially the most 
general indicator of the degree of cross-border financial integration. If risk-adjusted real rates 
of return on capital were equalised across countries then there would not need to be any 
relationship between the level of saving and investment in a particular country, as all 
investment projects, independent of location, would have access to the global pool of saving 
at uniform rates. Feldstein and Horioka (1980) use this idea to assess the degree of global 
capital market integration by estimating the correlation of saving and investment as a 
percentage of GDP among 16 OECD countries during the period 1960–74. Their estimates 
were much lower than implied by full capital market integration, with the coefficient on the 
savings ratio (or savings retention coefficient) being typically above 0.8, whereas full global 
financial integration would imply zero.
10 
                                                  
10   Feldstein (2005) has described how his estimation was prompted by a meeting of experts that he attended at 
the OECD 30 years ago, where the assumption of full cross-border financial integration seemed to be taken as 
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There are some indications that the original Feldstein-Horioka puzzle has become less 
prominent. Feldstein (2005) reports new research indicating that the segmentation of global 
financial markets has persisted among bigger mature economies but has been significantly 
reduced among the smaller ones. Interestingly, García-Herrero and Wooldridge (2007) report 
that the savings retention ratio seems to have fallen significantly during the 1990s and this 
decade for a representative group of emerging market countries. For the whole period 1982–
2006, they also report that the savings retention ratio is lowest in Latin America among 
regions of emerging market countries, being close to zero, whereas it is highest in Asia, at 
around 0.5. 
Summary 
Let us now draw some overall conclusions from the different indicators of cross-border 
financial integration. The main thing to note is that although the evidence is consistent with 
significant progress of financial globalisation in the last decade and a half, it also indicates 
that countries are in general a significant way off from the limiting case of full integration. 
Thus, even if international co-movements of asset returns have increased strongly during this 
period, in most cases the situation is some way from being perfect. However, there are a few 
small and medium-sized mature countries where correlations of changes in long-term 
interest rates with US rates have in recent years reached almost 90%. Furthermore, it seems 
that this development can only partly be explained by common shocks as some of these 
countries (eg New Zealand and Australia) were dealing with demand pressures at the same 
time as the US was trying to revive demand. That raises the question addressed in the next 
section of what will happen to the transmission mechanism of monetary policy as financial 
globalisation progresses. 
III. Financial  globalisation  and  the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy 
Taking a highly stylised view, monetary policy in mature economic systems can be seen to 
affect domestic demand through two channels.
11 The first of these is what this paper calls the 
interest rate channel: interest rates at medium and long maturities are partly driven by 
unanticipated current and expected future changes in short-term rates, which are in turn 
tightly aligned to policy rates, at least in normal times. This effect on longer-term rates is 
important as investment and consumption demand is generally much more responsive to 
medium- and long-term rates than to short rates. The second is the exchange rate channel: 
changes in policy rates change the interest rate differential vis-à-vis abroad, which in turn 
affects the exchange rate. For a small open economy that is not able to influence global 
interest rates, economic theory predicts that financial globalisation will gradually weaken the 
interest rate channel, and could even block it completely. However, the exchange rate 
channel would still be available to hit any inflation target in the medium to long run and 
potentially retain some countercyclical force in the short run, provided of course that the 
authorities allow the exchange rate to be flexible. 
                                                  
11   These effects are in general only short- to medium-term. Thus in this paper it is taken as given that monetary 
policy has no long-term effects on variables like demand, output, employment and the current account. 
However, it has short-run effects on demand and output and hence shifts actual and expected inflation 
around. In the long run monetary policy thus only determines the inflation rate. However, in order to do so it 
has to either have a short-term effect on demand or affect price determination directly, for instance through 
changes in the exchange rate. 16  BIS Papers No 39 
 
 
The prediction that financial globalisation will weaken the interest rate channel in small open 
economies might seem puzzling if it is assumed that the central bank will retain control of 
interest rates at the very shortest maturities. Note that this assumption is needed for the 
mechanism through which changes in policy rates are assumed to affect the exchange rate, 
ie through changes in the short-term interest rate differential. Furthermore, it seems to be 
well supported by experience. Thus those countries that have experienced weaker effects of 
short-term rates on longer-term rates have not been constrained in moving policy rates and 
have in general been able to control short-term rates rather tightly (eg New Zealand). If that 
is the case and interest rates at longer maturities are driven by expected short rates, how 
then can financial globalisation block the interest rate channel? The answer might be that it is 
expected global short-term rates, rather than domestic short-term rates, that increasingly 
drive domestic long-term rates in small open economies as financial globalisation 
progresses. If indeed financial globalisation is responsible for the observed high correlation 
of, for instance, New Zealand and US long-term rates,
12 even though the monetary stance of 
these two countries moves on occasions in the opposite direction, then it is due to current 
and expected US policy rates mattering more for New Zealand long rates than New Zealand 
policy rates, and not because the expectations theory of long-term rates as such is no longer 
relevant. 
Let us assume a world of full financial globalisation and a number of floating currencies. In 
this scenario, investors will be able to transfer huge amounts of funds between countries at 
negligible transaction costs. They will do so based on comparisons of expected real risk-
adjusted returns across assets that are denominated in different currencies. They will thus 
have to form expectations about exchange rate movements over the relevant maturities. 
They will calculate real returns in terms of their own consumption baskets. For the average 
investor in each currency area, this is equivalent to comparing nominal risk-adjusted returns 
in terms of their home currency. The implication is that, for the average investor, expected 
real risk-adjusted rates of return will tend to equalise. What it means for actual risk-adjusted 
real returns measured in terms of different currencies and price levels (eg New Zealand real 
interest rates versus US real interest rates) depends, however, on how expectations are 
formed and how price levels behave. 
One interesting benchmark is that of simultaneous full real and financial globalisation. In a 
similar fashion to the definition of financial globalisation we can define real globalisation as 
the cross-border integration of markets for goods, services and factors of production. In the 
extreme case, ie when real side globalisation has run its full course, all goods would be 
traded, ie there would be no domestic non-traded goods sector. Furthermore, there would be 
instant factor mobility, implying that factor returns are equalised across borders and that the 
domestic output gap becomes irrelevant and meaningless. In fact, there would be no specific 
national resource constraint. This state of affairs would probably be incompatible with 
national nominal rigidities and purchasing parity would hold at all times. Given “reasonable” 
assumptions about expectations (ie on average correct over the medium to long term) then 
this would also mean that equalisation of real risk-adjusted rates of return in terms of the 
currency of the investor will also imply such equalisation in terms of all currencies. 
For the small open economy that is unable to affect global financial conditions this means 
that monetary policy will not be able to affect domestic real interest rates, at least not at 
longer maturities. Its ability to affect domestic demand through the interest rate channel 
would then, in the most extreme case, disappear. 
                                                  
12   As discussed in other parts of this paper it is still an open question to what degree this high correlation is due 
to financial globalisation as such or other factors (eg correlated shocks or even global convergence of inflation 
targets and monetary policy frameworks as suggested by Berg in discussing an earlier version of this paper). BIS Papers No 39  17
 
 
Any weakening of the countercyclical force of monetary policy that this would entail need not 
be a problem. The reason is that countercyclical policy is not called for here as there is no 
domestic output gap that needs to be stabilised. However, monetary policy would be able to 
use the exchange rate channel to deliver any inflation target that the authorities would want. 
By creating deviations of the domestic nominal policy rate from the global rate, the domestic 
inflation rate can be made to diverge from the global interest rate. The law of one price would 
still hold, ie there would be real interest rate parity and purchasing power parity would be in 
force. This is really back to the world of perfect markets and the quantity theory. Monetary 
policy has no real effect. The only effect it has is to determine the inflation rate, which is also 
neutral in its effect on the real economy. 
The above case is of course a theoretical abstraction and the countries of the world are in 
most cases still far from this state of affairs. However, the result regarding the tendency of 
real risk-adjusted rates of return to be equalised will also hold in many other cases where 
there is full financial globalisation, in the meaning of negligible transaction costs and speedy 
arbitrage across national financial markets and currency zones, but still not full real side 
globalisation. Thus if longer-term nominal rates tend to be correlated due to financial 
globalisation, and nominal price levels are sticky, then there would also be a tendency for 
real rates to co-move, measured in terms of each country’s currency. 
These results are of course not new. Bob Mundell demonstrated in a series of articles in the 
early 1960s (eg Mundell (1963) and Mundell (1964)) that for the small open economy 
monetary policy working only through the exchange rate would be a powerful stabilisation 
tool when the exchange rate floats but totally ineffective when it is fixed. The reverse would 
hold for fiscal policy. Mundell’s model was heavily “Keynesian”. He assumed that money, 
wages and the price level were fixed as there were unemployed resources and constant 
returns to scale. The implication is that there is no pass-through from changes in the 
exchange rate to the price level and there is no need to make the distinction between 
nominal and real interest rates. Furthermore, there was only one interest rate in the model 
and monetary policy operated through changes in the money supply. Given these 
assumptions and that of totally free capital movements, the domestic interest rate was 
pegged at the global level.
13 
This section has demonstrated that financial globalisation will under many plausible 
conditions weaken the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission in small open 
economies and, in the most extreme cases, block it completely. To what degree that is a 
problem will depend partly on how well the exchange rate channel operates. If it works 
smoothly then there might not be much cause for concern. However, if there is excess 
volatility and exchange rates show tendencies to be decoupled from fundamentals then there 
is more to worry about. It is interesting in this regard that in some of the countries that seem 
to have been more strongly subject to the forces of financial globalisation, like New Zealand, 
there has been concern about the potential overburdening of the exchange rate channel and 
about excess volatility and misalignments potentially having detrimental effects on the traded 
goods sector. We will come back to this issue in Sections V and VI. 
                                                  
13   Mundell realised the extremity of this case, but also that what we now call financial globalisation is a process 
rather than a state of nature. In his own words: “I assume the extreme degree of mobility that prevails when a 
country cannot maintain an interest rate different from the general level prevailing abroad. This assumption will 
overstate the case but it has the merit of posing a stereotype towards which international financial relations 
seem to be heading” (Mundell (1963)). “I hope my assumptions are unrealistic. If they were not, I could not 
have made a contribution to theory” (Mundell (1964)). Making extreme assumptions is of course paramount to 
economic theory making but this has to be kept in mind when applying the theory to actual economic 
conditions. Macroeconomic textbooks rightly make the jump from totally controlled capital movements to 
frictionless capital movements from one page to the next. However, it might create the wrong impression that 
such an overnight transition can be made in the real world by governments abolishing all restrictions with a 
stroke of a pen. 18  BIS Papers No 39 
 
 
IV.  Recent evidence on the interest rate channel 
This section investigates the evolution of the interest rate channel of monetary policy 
transmission for a group of mature and emerging inflation targeting countries, mostly with 
open capital accounts. The focus is on the relative influence on domestic long rates of policy 
rates on the one hand and a representative global rate on the other. The analysis is based 
on a few assumptions that need to be spelt out. First, it is assumed that neither monetary 
policy nor the long rates of each of the countries in our sample affect the global long rate. 
That means that the global long rate can be taken to be exogenous for the determination of 
the domestic long rate. Second, it is assumed that central banks are able to exercise tight 
control over domestic short-term money market rates. Again, that means that the domestic 
short rate can be taken to be exogenous for the purpose of determining the domestic long 
rate. 
It has to be stressed that the correlations and econometric relationships investigated in this 
section cannot give definite results on whether financial globalisation is weakening the 
interest rate channel in small open economies or not. At best, it can tell whether the data is, 
or is not, consistent with the financial globalisation story. When coupled with plausible stories 
and auxiliary evidence, we might get further. 
It has already been mentioned that stronger co-movements of long-term interest rates could 
be due to other factors than financial globalisation, such as common shocks. However, if we 
were to observe the opposite, no strengthening of co-movements, or even a weakening, then 
we would have a pattern in the data that would be hard to reconcile with the financial 
globalisation story. Similar reasoning applies to the effect of changes in policy rates on 
longer-term rates. In a small open economy, a weakening of the relationship, and in the most 
extreme case its disappearance, could be due to financial globalisation where longer-term 
rates reflect more and more global, rather than domestic, current and expected future policy 
rates. But it could also be due to something else, where a credible fully anticipated monetary 
policy is a prime candidate. However, again, no weakening or even strengthening of the 
relationship would on the face of it be inconsistent with the financial globalisation story. 
Mature inflation targeting economies 
The assumptions above (ie open capital accounts, flexible exchange rates, etc) and data 
availability issues limit the sample to small and medium-sized mature economies and a few 
emerging market economies. For the first group of countries the investigation looks at 
monthly data for the period 1990–2006 for Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. 
Graph 5 
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First we look at simple rolling correlations of interest rate changes (36-month window of 
monthly data) for the sample of developed countries (see Table  1 and Graphs  3 and 5) 
during the period 1990–2006. Three sets of domestic interest rates are considered, ie 
3-month money market rates, medium-term (2- to 3-year) government bond rates and long-
term (10-year) government bond rates. The correlations reported are the following: domestic 
short-term and medium-term rates, domestic short-term and long-term rates, domestic long-
term and US long-term rates and domestic medium-term and US medium-term rates. Across 
the maturity spectrum and locations the following pattern should be expected: 
•  Domestic short-term rates being more strongly correlated with medium-term rates 
than long-term rates. 
•  Domestic long-term rates being more strongly correlated with US long-term rates 
than domestic medium-term rates are with US medium-term rates. 
The pattern through time that would be consistent with ongoing financial globalisation is the 
following: 
•  Domestic long-term and medium-term rates becoming more correlated with US 
rates, with the tendency being more pronounced in the case of long-term rates. 
•  The link between domestic short-term and long-term rates becoming weaker (and 
possibly also that between short-term and medium-term rates). 
 
Table 1 
Correlation of domestic and foreign interest rates
1 
Domestic short-term and  
longer-term rates  Domestic and US rates 
 
1990–93 1997–99 2001–03 2004–06 1990–93 1997–99 2001–03 2004–06
Medium-term          
Australia ...  0.6  0.2  0.4    ...    0.5  0.6  0.3 
Canada ...  0.4  0.5  0.4    ...    0.8  0.7  0.8 
New  Zealand  0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5   0.2   0.6  0.6  0.4 
Norway  0.9 0.6 0.6 0.7   0.0   –0.1  0.4  0.7 
Sweden  0.8 0.6 0.6  ...    –0.3    0.3 0.7  ... 
United  Kingdom  0.6 0.5 0.6 0.3   –0.1   0.7  0.8  0.5 
Long-term            
Australia  0.5 0.6 0.3 0.4   0.5   0.8  0.9  0.9 
Canada  0.5 0.2 0.1 0.4    0.7    0.9 0.9 0.9 
New  Zealand  0.7 0.4 0.2 0.4   0.2 0.8  0.8  0.8 
Norway  0.4 0.2 0.3 0.5   –0.1   0.4  0.7  0.8 
Sweden  0.5 0.3 0.3  ...    –0.1    0.6 0.8  ... 
United  Kingdom  0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3   0.2   0.7  0.8  0.7 
1  Monthly changes. 
Sources: National data; BIS estimates. 
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The results are broadly consistent with these priors. As can be seen in Table 1, domestic 
short-term rates are in general more correlated with medium-term rates than long-term rates 
and the correlation with US rates increases with maturity. It further emerges that correlations 
of domestic long-term rates with US rates have in most cases been increasing through time 
but that the tendency is less clear in the case of medium-term rates. Finally, there seems to 
be some tendency for the correlation between domestic short-term rates and long rates to 
weaken. However, the tendency is not uniform and there are clearly periods where it 
weakens significantly and then comes back, which is not consistent with progressing 
financial globalisation. 
Simple correlations of the above type can at best be only indicative. They do not address 
issues of causality, although our assumptions, if correct, take care of that. Neither do they 
take into account lags in the relationships or joint determination by several variables. In order 
to deal with these added complexities an error correction model of the domestic long-term 
interest rate is specified below. Although plausible, it is somewhat arbitrary by assuming two 
co-integrating vectors where only one of the exogenous variables (domestic short rates and 
US long rates) enters each. These restrictions remain to be tested at a later stage but for the 
current investigation of the evolution of the interest rate channel we let it be. 
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i = nominal interest rate, l stands for long, s stands for short and lg stands for global long 
(proxied by US rates). 
Equation (1) could be simplified by constraining both the γ’s to be equal to 1. This is not a 
strong assumption as any other value will imply that there is a trend increase (or decrease) in 
the slope of the domestic yield curve and the long-term interest rate spread vis-à-vis the US. 
Neither is plausible given the sample period and the countries involved. Given this constraint 
we get (2), 


























1    (2) 
where  2 1 c c g s β + β + α = ∗ α  
The βs are measures of adjustment speeds to the long-run equilibrium levels (provided they 
exist). They should therefore have negative signs. If a β is not significantly different from zero 
then there is no long-run relation. Care should be exercised in interpreting the implications of 
non-significant β, especially in the case of the short-long relation. It does not mean that there 
is no interest rate channel. We do not expect monetary policy to be able to exert long-run 
influences on long-term real interest rates. If inflation expectations over the medium term are 
anchored at a stable inflation target, as should be the case in the current sample of 
countries, then the same would apply to nominal long rates. All that is required for there to be 
an interest rate channel is for monetary policy to have influence on longer maturity rates over 
the short and medium term.
14 
                                                  
14  Note that what is being tested here is different from the tests of monetary independence in Obstfeld and 
Taylor (2004). They look at the ability of countries to set short-term interest rates different from a base country. 
That ability is not being questioned in this case. All these countries have floating exchange rates and one has 
only to look at the short-term interest rate differentials to see that they can set different rates from the US. 
Frankel et al (2002) are also of relevance in this connection. They look at a large sample of developing and 
industrialised countries during the period 1970–99 and find in most cases full long-run transmission of 
international interest rates to domestic rates, even for countries with floating exchange rate regimes. The only 
exceptions are the very largest developed countries, which can thus benefit from independent monetary policy 
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Equation (2) is estimated for seven mature small and medium-sized inflation targeting 
countries, both with and without the error correction terms. The results are given in Tables 2 
and 3. The regressions explain 40–70% of the changes in domestic long rates, with the error 




Coefficients on long-run relations 
Short and long interest rates (βs)  Long domestic and US interest 
rates (βg)   
1990–2006 1990–98 1999–2006 1990–2006 1990–98 1999–2006
Australia    –0.01   –0.01     0.01    –0.02**   –0.02   –0.04* 
Canada    –0.02**   –0.03**   –0.00    –0.01   –0.05*   –0.01 
New  Zealand    –0.02*   –0.04**     0.01    –0.04***   –0.04**   –0.04** 
Norway    –0.02*   –0.02   –0.02**    –0.04***   –0.06*   –0.01 
Sweden    –0.02   –0.02   –0.07    –0.03***   –0.04*   –0.03 
Switzerland    –0.02***   –0.02**   –0.02    –0.04**   –0.04   –0.05 
United  Kingdom    –0.01    –0.02   0.02   –0.01    –0.03   –0.06* 
Sources: National data; BIS estimates. *, **, *** denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Table 2 gives the results for the coefficients on the error correction terms (βs and βg). Looking 
first at the coefficient on the short-long relation, for the whole period there is only a strongly 
significant relationship in the cases of Canada and Switzerland. Splitting the sample gives 
some indication of a weakening relationship. The main exception is Norway, but these results 
are probably coloured by the fact that Norway operated a fixed exchange rate policy until the 
late 1990s. The results for the coefficient on the level relationship between domestic and US 
long rates do not give a particularly clear pattern. There is some indication of a faster 
adjustment speed and/or a more significant relationship in some countries (Australia and 
UK), weakening in others (Canada, Norway and Sweden) and unchanged in two cases (New 
Zealand and Switzerland). 
The cumulative impact of first difference terms only might provide additional indications (see 
Table 3). There seems to be an almost uniform tendency of a weaker cumulative impact of 
first differences of short-term interest rates on the corresponding change in the long-term 
interest rates, with it almost disappearing in the case of Australia, Canada and New Zealand. 
The only exception is Norway, but then it operated exchange rate targeting until the late 
1990s. The cumulative impact of the first differences of US long-term rates on the change in 
the domestic long rates is high for the whole sample period. However, in most cases it is 
lower in the second half of the sample period than in the first half. This might seem to 
contradict the results of the simple correlation.  
                                                                                                                                                      
in the medium to long run. However, all we need for monetary policy to play a role through the interest rate 
channel is short- to medium-run monetary independence. Again, Frankel et al use short-term rates. 
15   All the estimated equations include one lag of the dependent variable (domestic long-term rate), current value 
of the domestic short-term rate and up to two lags, and current value of the US long-term rate and two lags. 22  BIS Papers No 39 
 
 
Emerging market economies 
Mohanty (2007) summarises findings at the BIS and discussions from a December 2006 
meeting of Deputy Governors from emerging market countries on recent changes in the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy in emerging market economies.
16 For the same 
meeting Moreno (2007) looks specifically at the issue of the determination of long-term rates 
in these countries and the relative influences of policy rates and global long rates (proxied by 
US rates). Not surprisingly, the picture that emerges is mixed. Many emerging market 
economies are still in the phase where the development of the domestic financial system is 
strengthening the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission and several of them 
still have significant capital controls. However, at the same time some emerging market 
countries are experiencing a stronger influence of global long rates on domestic rates, which 
in some cases is stronger than the influence of the domestic policy rate. These influences 
were both confirmed by answers to a questionnaire and econometric estimation. Thus 
Moreno (2007) estimates a vector autoregression system in first differences of the domestic 
short-term and long-term rates and the long foreign rate using daily data from the beginning 
of 2001 to the end of September 2006. Different maturities of long-term rates were used, ie 
1-, 3-, 5- and 10-year, for India, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Brazil, Mexico, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Although there was significant country variation in 
the results it emerged that foreign long-term rates sometimes have a larger impact than 





Short-term interest rates on 
domestic long-term interest rates 
US long-term interest rates on 
domestic long-term interest rates   
1990–2006 1990–98 1999–2006 1990–2006 1990–98 1999–2006
Australia  0.18 0.16    0.02 0.92 1.04 0.79 
Canada  0.14 0.14    0.04 0.89 1.06 0.63 
New  Zealand  0.25 0.27    –0.01 0.72 0.73 0.74 
Norway  0.22 0.22    0.31 0.68 0.60 0.76 
Sweden  0.17 0.16    0.16 0.84 0.88 0.75 
Switzerland  0.38 0.47    0.25 0.83 0.88 0.75 
United  Kingdom  0.29 0.30    0.21 0.67 0.76 0.49 
1  Calculated as the ratio between the sum of the coefficients of contemporaneous and lagged domestic short-
term interest rates and one minus the sum of the coefficients of lagged domestic long-term rates. Monthly 
changes in domestic long-term interest rates were regressed on monthly changes in domestic short-term 
interest rates, monthly changes in lagged long-term domestic interest rates and monthly changes in long-term 
interest rates of the United States. 
Sources: National data; BIS estimates. 
                                                  
16   A similar meeting a few years earlier discussed in broad terms the progress and effects of financial integration 
in emerging market countries (see Andersen and Moreno (2005) for an overview). One of the papers for that 
meeting addressed the issue of whether financial globalisation had reduced monetary independence in 
emerging market economies (see Mohanty and Scatigna (2005)). Wooldridge et al (2003) analyse the 




The results of this data exercise are not conclusive. There is evidence of a close and 
strengthening relationship between domestic and US long-term rates. There is also some 
evidence of a weak and/or weaker relationship between domestic long-term rates and 
current and lagged short-term rates. Both of these tendencies are consistent with ongoing 
financial globalisation but also with common shocks and more credible and more anticipated 
monetary policy. In general, even if the interest rate channel might be getting weaker, it 
cannot be proclaimed dead. 
V.  The exchange rate channel 
In Section II it was shown that cross-border financial integration will make the domestic 
interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission weaker, and in the most extreme 
cases, inoperative. However, this will still leave the exchange rate channel to determine, in 
the long run, the inflation rate. Depending on the state of real cross-border integration and 
short-run wage and price rigidities it could also provide some short-run stabilisation through 
its effect on the traded goods sector. 
How well the exchange rate channel will work in this regard will to a significant degree 
depend on how closely exchange rates are aligned with fundamentals. That is, however, 
where the concerns seem to arise. Evidence seems to suggest foreign exchange markets 
exhibit excess volatility and that exchange rates diverge from fundamentals for lengthy 
periods. The existence of carry trades can in some sense be taken as evidence of this, as it 
involves a bet that interest rate differentials are not fully compensated by exchange rate 
movements, ie that uncovered interest rate parity does not hold. According to the theory of 
uncovered interest rate parity, low-yielding currencies should be expected to appreciate and 
high-yielding currencies to depreciate. However, what we observe over lengthy periods is the 
reverse, followed by sharp corrections.
17 In this regard, one could reflect on the yen versus 
the New Zealand dollar. 
The basic problem is that the exchange rate has a dual nature. On the one hand it is a 
macroeconomic adjustment tool and probably the most important relative price of small and 
medium-sized open economies, and on the other hand it is an asset price with all the 
potential problems that can be associated with that. This means that the exchange rate can 
potentially be both a tool for stabilisation and a source of shocks. What aspect dominates in 
this regard is ultimately an empirical question and will in specific cases depend on structural 
features of individual countries and might be affected by the constellation of monetary, fiscal 
and prudential policies.
18 
The Great Moderation (greater stability of real growth and inflation) does not show up much 
in real exchange rates. Table  4, however, indicates that the volatility of real effective 
exchange rates at a monthly frequency is less for the majority of the countries included in the 
Table during the last five years than it is for the two preceding six-year periods starting in 
                                                  
17   Plantin and Shin (2006) provide a theoretical analysis of carry trades and speculative dynamics. Their findings 
suggest that markets such as the foreign exchange market, which combine significant costs of carry and low 
“resiliency” have the pre-conditions for large and persistent deviations of prices from fundamentals, followed 
by abrupt reversals. Their model predicts that UIP will fail and that a high-yielding currency will go “up by the 
stairs” and come “down with the elevator”. 
18   Ho and McCauley (2003) give a good review of the experience of inflation targeting emerging market 
economies in living with flexible exchange rates and provide an interesting discussion of the associated policy 
issues. 24  BIS Papers No 39 
 
 
1990. However, there are a few examples among the IT countries where volatility is higher 
(Canada, New Zealand, Norway and Chile). Furthermore, visual inspection of Graph  6 
seems to indicate that although the high-frequency volatility might in many cases be lower in 
the last few years, the overall swings do not seem to have been noticeably reduced. To take 
examples, both Australia and New Zealand had two exchange rate cycles during this period. 
If the amplitude of each cycle is measured by the average of the changes from peak to 
bottom and back again, then in the case of Australia the first one was 15% and the second 
28%. The respective figures for New Zealand are, strikingly, 27% and 41%. 
 
Table 4 
Volatility of real effective exchange rate
1 
  1990–95 1996–2001 2002–06 
United States  1.49  1.17  1.40 
Japan 2.64  2.73  1.46 
Germany 0.98  0.93  0.74 
Australia 2.16  2.21  1.65 
Canada 1.23  1.12  1.51 
New Zealand  1.29  1.82  1.94 
Norway 0.76  1.11  1.63 
Sweden 1.97  1.32  1.10 
Switzerland 1.42  1.19  0.88 
United Kingdom  1.81  1.48  1.13 
Hong Kong SAR  1.47  1.57  1.30 
Korea 1.47  4.52  1.38 
Malaysia 1.46  2.99  0.98 
Singapore 0.85  1.38  0.93 
Thailand 0.82  3.84  0.95 
Chile 2.22  1.75  2.15 
Mexico 4.83  2.32  1.90 
South Africa  1.32  3.15  3.89 
All economies
2 1.68  2.03  1.50 
Mature IT countries
2 1.57 1.51 1.34 
Selected emerging Asian 
economies
2 1.21  2.86  1.11 
1    Measured as the standard deviation of monthly changes; in terms of relative consumer prices.    
2  Unweighted average. 
Sources: Central banks; IMF; BIS. BIS Papers No 39  25
 
 
How much does this matter? The real economic costs of exchange rate volatility have proven 
hard to quantify. Estimates of the effects on trade and growth are usually much smaller than 
seem to be implicit in the discussions of many politicians and businessmen.
19 Furthermore, 
there does not seem to be a significant trade-off between exchange rate volatility and the 
volatility of important macroeconomic variables.
20 On the other hand there is a literature that 
indicates that the existence of separate currencies might be a significantly stronger 
impediment to trade. Thus, Andrew Rose has in several empirical papers found that 
membership in a monetary union increases trade with the other members very significantly at 
the same time as trade diversion seems to be small. Increased trade in turn increases 
growth.
21 Further evidence is provided by Frankel and Wei (1995), using a gravity model of 
bilateral trade, who find that membership in the EU increases trade with other EU members 
by at least 60%. 
One possible way to square these results is to say that if you do have your own currency 
then its volatility within the bounds usually observed does not matter that much. However, if 
de facto and expected volatility vis-à-vis natural trading partners goes all the way to zero 
then the effects will be strong. It is only at that point that expected exchange rate volatility 
goes to zero and associated risk premia in domestic interest rates disappear. 
A possible conclusion from all of this is the following: the exchange rate channel will work at 
the end of the day, although financial globalisation might be making the road bumpier. That 
might not matter too much, partly because financial globalisation is also providing the 
instruments (hedging etc) to reduce the cost of exchange rate volatility. However, if the cost 
of excess volatility in exchange rates is judged to be too high for small countries to bear, then 
they might consider entering a monetary union. 
VI. Some  policy  issues 
The problems and challenges created for macroeconomic management in small but 
financially developed economies by ongoing financial globalisation can on the basis of the 
discussion in the sections above be summarised as follows: 
•  It is becoming more difficult to be out of sync with the rest of the world; 
•  The interest rate channel of monetary policy is becoming weaker and less 
predictable; 
•  Speculative capital flows are creating volatility in the exchange rate and at times 
significant decoupling from fundamentals; 
•  Such exchange rate volatility and overburdening of the exchange rate channel can 
have detrimental effects on the traded goods sector. 
This short section will not provide a lengthy discussion of the potential policy responses to 
these problems. There is already an interesting discussion of those in several countries, not 
the least in New Zealand. Thus, for instance, the authorities in New Zealand have initiated a 
major review of its macroeconomic and prudential policies (see, for example, Reserve Bank 
of New Zealand (2006)). However, we can sketch the general directions that small and 
                                                  
19  See, for instance, Rogoff (1998). Levine and Carkovic (2001) obtain similar results in a panel study of the 
growth equation covering 73 countries over the period 1960–95. 
20   See Flood and Rose (1995). 
21   See Frankel and Rose (2002). These results have also been strongly disputed. 26  BIS Papers No 39 
 
 
medium-sized countries can take when faced with a weakened interest rate channel and a 
misbehaving exchange rate. It seems that they have basically three options. 
First, they can decide to live with it. After all, they will eventually be able to deliver their 
inflation target. The road will be bumpy in terms of exchange rate volatility and potential 
misalignments but it is not clear how strong the detrimental effects on the traded goods 




Second, they can try to sharpen and realign existing instruments in order to reduce the 
burden on monetary policy and exchange rate adjustment with the aim of reducing adverse 
effects on the traded goods sector. This would involve measures like shifting the policy mix in 
the direction of fiscal policy, recalibrating prudential instruments with a view to minimising 
procyclicality, reviewing the tax and incentive structures of asset markets, particularly 
housing, and maybe even an occasional foreign exchange intervention. This seems to be the 
road upon which New Zealand, the pioneer of inflation targeting, is currently embarking. 
However, it remains to be seen how much mileage can be got out of measures of this type; 
there are, for instance, political economy problems with using fiscal policy for short-run 
stabilisation purposes, especially if there is already a significant fiscal surplus. 
Finally, they could radically change the framework by entering a monetary union. Each 
country faces different options and its particular pros and cons in such regard. However, it is 
clear that, as both real and financial globalisation progress, the relative attractiveness of 
entering a monetary union increases, everything else being equal. The reason is that the 
world is heading in a direction where, for small economies that are unable to influence global 
interest rates, countercyclical monetary policy will be both impossible and unnecessary. BIS Papers No 39  27
 
 
However, in many cases, especially among emerging market economies, we are still far from 
that state of affairs, and might never completely get there. 
VII. Conclusions 
The interest rate channel of monetary policy will strengthen as domestic financial markets 
develop. Furthermore, liberalisation of capital movements will in most cases provide an 
additional impetus to domestic financial market development, thus strengthening the interest 
rate channel still more. However, theory predicts that financial globalisation will gradually 
weaken the interest rate channel in small open economies that are unable to affect global 
financial conditions, and in the most extreme cases block it completely. That will leave the 
exchange rate channel to deliver the inflation target and provide some short-run stabilisation. 
Financial globalisation is a process and not a state of nature. It is therefore important to 
attempt to measure where individual countries and the world as a whole are in the process. 
This paper has surveyed various measures based on legal and regulatory frameworks, 
prices and quantities. What emerges is a mixed picture. Although there has been significant 
progress in financial globalisation in the last decade and a half, most countries are a 
significant way off from the limiting case of full integration. However, there are a few small 
and medium-sized mature economies where correlations of domestic long-term bond yields 
with global yields have become very high. This is consistent with the financial globalisation 
story but might also be caused by other factors, such as common shocks. However, there 
are a few cases (eg Australia and New Zealand) where common shocks cannot plausibly 
explain the correlation. 
The data indicates that the effects of changes in policy rates on interest rates at longer 
maturities have become weaker among small and medium-sized mature inflation targeting 
countries. Similar, but weaker, effects can be found among emerging market economies. 
However, the data does not yet support proclaiming the interest rate channel dead. 
Moreover, although this trend is consistent with ongoing financial globalisation, it is also 
consistent with other explanations, such as more strongly anticipated credible monetary 
policy. It remains a challenge, and a matter for further research, to statistically distinguish 
between these two.   
A weakening of the interest rate channel might be seen as a problem if the exchange rate 
channel is not well behaved due to excess volatility and decoupling from fundamentals. 
There is currently a lively discussion of the associated policy issues. Broadly speaking, small 
open economies face three options: to live with the situation, sharpen and realign existing 
policy instruments, or enter a monetary union. It will be interesting to observe how the policy 
discussion will unfold in the years to come. 
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